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Abstract 
This study investigates the impact and effectiveness of a public R&D support policy. In a 
policy design that aims at incentivizing radical as well as incremental innovations, we test 
where the policy impact is highest. While the privately motivated R&D expenditures are 
significant for both types of innovation, the policy-induced part is significant only for radical 
innovation. Furthermore, given that the funding agency encourages collaboration, and 
particularly industry-science collaboration, we further test whether effects are enhanced in 
collaborating firms. We do not find any evidence pointing to increased effects for the latter. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Innovation is largely acknowledged to be a main factor of a country’s sustainable and 
competitive development (Aghion & Howitt, 1992; Griliches, 1990; Romer, 1990). It is also 
recognized that due to market imperfections, firms are unlikely to reap all the benefits from 
their research, leading to underinvestment in R&D in the economy. Therefore, governmental 
support is a widely accepted means to foster socially valuable innovation.  
The concept of market imperfection goes back to Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), who state 
that firms do not invest the socially desired level in R&D efforts due to market imperfections 
including limited approbiability, lower private than social returns, financial market 
constraints, high risks about technological standards, high costs and high uncertainty of R&D 
projects and further forms of negative externalities (Martin & Scott, 2000). The implications 
of this under-investment in R&D have encouraged policy makers to establish public support 
mechanisms. In the current paper, we are interested in one particular type of support, namely 
direct funding for R&D projects. More precisely, we aim at contributing to an on-going 
debate about the returns of public R&D funding (Jones & Williams, 1998; Salter & Martin, 
2001), and in particular about whether public money is used in the most effective way (David 
& Hall, 2000; David, Hall, & Toole, 2000; Klette, Møen, & Griliches, 2000). In order to do 
so, we investigate the impact of the Swiss public support policy on outcome characteristics 
that have so far largely been ignored in this stream of literature. Specifically, we analyse 
where the policy effect is highest: incremental or radical innovation.  
Based on the market failure theory stipulating that under-investment in R&D may be 
particularly pronounced for more radical innovations because of higher uncertainty linked to 
such projects, one may expect to see an effect of public support on radical rather than on 
incremental innovation. Indeed, as shown by Karlsson, Friis, and Paulsson (2004) for 
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instance, there is a higher probability of no returns on investment for more radical innovation 
when compared to incremental innovation. Likewise, given the riskier nature of such 
projects, firms may have more difficulties to find external funding (see e.g. Kamien & 
Schwartz, 1978). As a consequence, given that funding agencies want to stimulate projects 
which are socially desirable but would not be undertaken without public support, one would 
assume that the impact is particularly pronounced for the latter. In the case of the Swiss 
innovation policy, the goal is however not merely destined at promoting frontier breaking 
innovation but also to maintain or enhance the competitiveness of the recipient firms, which 
can be achieved through incremental and radical innovations alike. It is therefore of high 
interest to know if the created impact is the same for both types of projects or if one type 
yields more returns than the other.  
For the policy maker, such information is crucial in order to optimize the policy structure. 
Indeed, it is essential to know if the ex-ante project evaluation is appropriate to prevent firms 
from crowding-out of private R&D expenditures due to public R&D funding. Consequently, 
in a first step, we investigate the effectiveness of the policy scheme and test if the subsidy 
leads to higher R&D expenditures. In a second step, we analyse how this policy induced 
R&D expenditures translate into innovation output, differentiating between radical and 
incremental innovation. Indeed, even in case of positive input additionality (meaning higher 
R&D expenditures due to the subsidy), it remains unclear if the policy induced R&D is as 
productive as the privately induced R&D. Indeed, based on portfolio maximization theory, 
firms spent their private money first on projects with the highest expected returns. In case of 
equal (or even higher) productivity, it remains so far indeterminate whether the impact is 
highest for more radical or more incremental innovation projects. Therefore, a first and main 
contribution of this paper lies in disentangling the effects of privately invested and publicly 
induced R&D on innovation outcome, according to the degree of novelty of the products.  
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Our second contribution pertains to taking into account the firms’ collaboration status. It has 
been proven that R&D collaboration is likely to impact innovation performance due to 
spillover effects, risk and cost sharing. Collaboration is therefore encouraged by the funding 
agency. Taking collaboration as well as the type of collaboration into account is therefore 
crucial as it can advise policy makers on the efficiency of this policy criterion. Within the 
various collaboration types, the Swiss funding agency particularly encourages collaboration 
with science. Shedding light on whether collaboration has an important impact on innovation 
outcome as well as what type of collaboration (i.e. is it mainly science, as encouraged by the 
agency or do other partners also play a role?) seems therefore particularly relevant in this 
context. So far, the literature does not advice on this issue, as the impact of the type of partner 
in a subsidy scheme has not been analysed in previous papers. Indeed, most papers in the 
evaluation literature merely account for R&D collaboration (if at all), but do not pay attention 
to partner diversity.  
Thirdly, the present study is undertaken on a representative sample of Swiss firms, which 
despite being considered an innovation leader among OECD countries, has not received as 
much attention as many other countries on this subject.  
Finally, in contrast to most policy evaluation studies, our analysis also allows drawing 
conclusions from a managerial perspective. Knowing where the impact of an R&D subsidy is 
highest in order for them to best adapt grant application efforts to innovation strategies plays 
indeed an important role. Likewise, knowing whether input and/or output additionality is 
enhanced through collaboration (as well as through the type of partner) seems essential 
information for a manager to optimize its R&D project portfolio. 
We base our analysis on a representative firm-level data-set covering the period between 
1999 to 2011 of the Swiss innovation survey. We find that, on average, the receipt of an R&D 
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subsidy translates into higher R&D investment. In terms of innovation performance, we find 
that the impact of public support is only significant for radical innovation, while no impact of 
policy-induced R&D is found for incremental innovation. Privately financed R&D on the 
other hand is significant for both types of innovation. In terms of collaboration, we do not 
find evidence that the impact of the policy is improved through collaboration. We can thus 
conclude that while the Swiss public R&D policy is efficient in terms of stimulating R&D 
investment and innovation performance of more radical nature, the current tendency of 
encouraging R&D collaboration does not seem to enhance such effects. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE SWISS INNOVATION POLICY  
Many countries have launched innovation policy programs to promote national innovative-
ness and competitiveness. An outstanding performance in R&D and innovation activities is 
considered an important factor not only for economic growth but also for a sustainable 
economic perspective in terms of employment, ecology and education for a modern 
knowledge society. In Switzerland, public funding of R&D has increased by 5.3% between 
2000 and 2010. In 2010, the financial budget for appropriations or outlays dedicated to R&D 
covers an amount of 4.6 billion CHF, which corresponds to 0.81% of the country’s GDP. In 
an international comparison (measures from 2008), Switzerland holds the eleventh rank of 31 
OECD countries with public R&D funding corresponding to 0.73% of the country’s GDP. 
The United States (1.02%) and Finland (0.98%) are on the top positions of the public funding 
per GDP ratio (FSO, 2012).  
In Switzerland there are two major R&D funding agencies providing public grants for R&D 
programs and projects—the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) and the Commission 
for Technology and Innovation (CTI)—with a total budget of 1.0 billion CHF in 2010. While 
the SNSF is mainly in charge of providing public grants to R&D projects or programs 
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conducted by public research institutes or by individual researchers, the CTI is the 
responsible funding agency for R&D projects in the private sector, with a total budget of 118 
Mio CHF in 2010. As a consequence, the subsidies under review in this study mainly stem 
from the CTI. 
The subsidy scheme is not based on calls for proposals, but firms can apply with R&D 
projects all year long. Likewise, there are no restrictions in terms of technology fields 
supported by the agencies. Nonetheless, the CTI has the general goal to stimulate innovation 
in SMEs and encourages joint R&D activities between private companies and public research 
institutes. The focus of the policy is two-fold: on the one hand, the agency provides support 
for applied and market-oriented R&D projects which lead to the generation of improved 
technologies and products to strengthen the country’s innovation position (CTI, 2011). On the 
other hand, the CTI also supports high risk but promising, cutting-edge technologies.  As can 
be seen in Figure 1 on the subsidy distribution by innovation type, there is hardly any 
difference between the number of subsidies going to firms with radical or incremental 
innovation output.1  
  
                                                
1 The distribution of subsidies across firm size classes and sectors can be found in Appendix 1, Tables 
A.1 and A.2. 
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Figure 1: Subsidy distribution by innovation type. 
 
Source: Own calculations. Data derived from the Innovation survey conducted by the Swiss 
Economic Institute (KOF). 
 
Applicant firms have to provide a detailed description on the project’s impact and a clear 
business and financial plan. The ex-ante evaluation is done by external and internal referees, 
which evaluate the expected effectiveness of the R&D projects. In 2010, 780 projects were 
evaluated, and 343 (44%) projects have been retained for public support (CTI, 2013).  
In case of a positive evaluation, the firm receives a subsidy in form of a matched grant, where 
the public funding typically covers up to approximately 50% of the expected costs (CTI, 
2011, 2013). That is, the recipient firm always faces a co-financing clause by which is it held 
to finance half of the project costs from private resources. In 2010, 667 firms are involved in 
co-funded R&D projects, among which almost three quarters (74%) were SMEs (CTI, 2013). 
The average project duration is of 20 months and the average project size amounts to 682.2 
thousand Swiss francs.2 As can be seen by Table 1, the number of subsidized firms has 
remained very stable over the period under review.  
                                                
2 Data about project duration is provided by ARAMIS, a database of the Swiss federal administration. 
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Table 1: Subsidy distribution over survey period 1999-2011. 
Year Number of firms 
 
Percentages of  
non-subsidized firms 
Percentages of  
subsidized firms 
1997-99 1,140 90.70 9.30 
2000-02 1,370 93.80 6.20 
2003-05 1,310 90.61 9.39 
2006-08 1,124 91.46 8.54 
2009-11 1,140 88.07 11.93 
Total 6,084 (100%) 91.03 (on average) 8.97 (on average) 
 
3 OUR RESEARCH QUESTION IN LIGHT OF RECENT LITERATURE 
3.1 The Impact of R&D support  
Empirical evidence on R&D subsidies is common in the literature to date. In terms of input 
additionality, it has been shown that the null hypothesis of full crowding out can be rejected 
in the vast majority of cases. In other words, most studies find that firms receiving public 
support invest more in R&D than if they would not have been supported. The subsidy hence 
reaches its goal of stimulating R&D investment. Indeed, Hall and Maffioli (2008) have found 
that in empirical literature since 2000, total crowding out effects were only found for the US 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, analysed by Wallsten (2000).3 
In terms of output additionality, evidence confirms that subsidies have a positive impact on 
innovation performance, as measured for instance by patent outcome (see e.g. Czarnitzki and 
Hussinger (2004) or Czarnitzki and Licht (2006)) or novelty sales (see for instance Czarnitzki 
and Lopes-Bento (2014) for a sample of German firms or (Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 
(2014a) for a sample of Belgian firms). In a recent study on Swiss firms, Arvanitis, Donze, 
                                                
3 See Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) for an overview on relevant recent empirical studies; and 
Cerulli (2010) for a critical overview on the different applied methods. 
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and Sydow (2010) found evidence for improved innovation performance of supported firms 
with respect to six different measures of innovation performance.4 
Papers distinguishing the productivity effects of privately respectively publicly funded R&D 
remain limited to date. Even though Madsen, Clausen, and Ljunggren (2008) suggest that 
input and output additionality are interrelated, to the best of our knowledge only Czarnitzki 
and Hussinger (2004), Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) and Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014a) 
consider this disentanglement and find a positive impact of publicly induced R&D investment 
on patenting activities in German firms and novelty sales in Belgium firms respectively.  
The latter do not differentiate between the degree of novelty in innovation sales though. 
Compared to the above studies, the current analysis further considers the disentangled 
investment in light of the degree of novelty of the innovation outcome. Indeed, one of the 
primary dimensions used to distinguish between degrees of innovation is the perpetuity 
between radical and incremental innovation (Garcia & Calantone, 2002; Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986). The former is typically defined as being new and different from prior 
solutions and the latter is characterized as making minor changes from (or adjustment to) 
existing practices, products, and services (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013; Schilling, 
2013)). As stipulated by Garcia and Calantone (2002), the difference between incremental 
and radical innovation is crucial. Radicalness is typically conceived as a combination of 
                                                
4 Their respective outcome variables include: Importance of introduced innovations from a technical 
point of view, Importance of introduced innovations from an economic point of view, Percentage 
reduction of average variable production costs due to process innovation, Sales of significantly 
improved or modified (already existing) products as a percentage of total sales, Sales of products new 
to the firm or to the market as a percentage of total sales, Sales of products new to the market 
worldwide as a percentage of total sales. While one of the main contributions of this paper was to 
compare the ATE of these outcome variables using 4 different matching estimators, it did not analyze 
how policy-induced investment translates into certain types of innovation performance when compared 
to privately-financed R&D investment at the firm level. As a consequence, it also did not take other 
firm or policy characteristics into account when estimating how the subsidy translates into output. The 
present study remedies to these shortcomings by estimating the treatment effect at the firm level, 
distinguishing between privately- and policy-induced investment in terms of innovation performance 
and by controlling for other relevant characteristics in this second step of the estimation, thereby 
providing novel and more in-depth policy implications.  
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newness and the degree of differentness (Ritala & Sainio, 2014). Therefore, radical 
innovation is not only capable of significantly impacting firm performance, but it also has the 
potential to change the structure of the market, to create new markets or to render existing 
products obsolete. Furthermore, radical innovations have the potential to push the 
technological frontier of a firm or even sector and may allow a firm to enter new markets. It 
is however also often involved with higher costs and higher risks, since it is typically 
embodied in new, and thereby less familiar, knowledge (Schilling, 2013). It may thus well be 
that projects of radical nature are less likely to be undertaken by firms left to themselves as 
firms have to be willing to bear the inherent risk of this endeavour. Furthermore, they also 
have to be able to provide the necessary funding for such projects, as due to the more risky 
nature, investors and external financiers are generally more reluctant to finance such projects 
(Czarnitzki, Hottenrott, & Thorwarth, 2011). Since the assumption is that firms are often risk-
averse and financially constrained, this could lead to a sub-optimal allocation of radical vs. 
incremental innovation (Arrow & Lind, 1970).  
Incremental innovations on the other hand can be considered the “lifeblood of an organiza-
tion” (p. 123) because they act  “first as a competitive weapon in a technologically mature 
market; and second, because streamlined procedures based on existing technology can help 
alert a business in good times to threats and opportunities associated with the shift to a new 
technological plateau” (Johne & Snelson, 1988, p. 115). Hence, incremental innovations are 
crucial to ensure small improvements to existing products, helping to maintain or improve 
their competitive position over time. They also play an undeniable role in adapting products 
or product lines to new or enhanced features increasingly desired by customers.  
As a consequence, both types of innovation are important determinants for the success of a 
firm, both being of different nature and impacting the firm in different ways. Distinguishing 
these two types of innovation therefore constitutes an important characteristic in a policy 
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evaluation context, as it allows to better orient the policy to the target or the priority of the 
economic context under review (Nemet, 2009). 
However, it is difficult to predict ex-ante where the policy effect will be highest and whether 
the selection process of the funding agency is efficient in light of the type of innovation in 
which the additional investment will be destined to. This is precisely one of the gaps that this 
study aims to fil.  
3.2 The impact of R&D collaboration  
It has long been acknowledged that R&D collaboration plays an important role, for the type 
as well as the success of innovation projects. Allowing to limit outgoing spillovers by 
internalizing them to the research consortium and providing access to complementary know-
how and resources of partnering firms, it has been shown that R&D collaboration can 
enhance private R&D activities substantially (see for instance D'Aspremont & Jacquemin, 
1988; DeBondt, 1997; Kaiser, 2002; Kamien, Muller, & Zang, 1992; Katz, 1986).  
Subsidized collaborative R&D has received less attention though in the empirical literature so 
far. Exceptions are Sakakibara (2001) and Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002) who analyzed 
Japanese government-sponsored R&D consortia. Both studies found evidence that 
participating firms have higher R&D expenditures as well as more patents. Further, 
Czarnitzki, Ebersberger, and Fier (2007) apply a matching estimator in a multiple treatment 
setting, analyze the effects of R&D collaboration and public R&D funding on R&D per sales 
and patent outcomes for Germany and Finland and find that collaboration has positive effects. 
Finally, Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014a) find that in a sample of Belgian firms, 
international collaborating firms have a higher subsidy treatment effect than nationally or 
non-collaborating firms.  
 12/49 
The aspect of various partner types (i.e. horizontal, vertical or collaboration with science) 
within a subsidy scheme has so far not yet been analysed in the evaluation literature though. 
However, since funding agencies often encourage industry-science links, having evidence on 
the impact of subsidized projects with specific partners would allow to shed new light on the 
efficacy of such policy criteria. Indeed, studies have acknowledged the role played by various 
partner types and the impact they may have on innovation performance (Belderbos, Carree, 
Diederen, Lokshin, & Veugelers, 2004; de Faria, Lima, & Santos, 2010; Faems, Van Looy, & 
Debackere, 2005; Kaiser, 2002). However, to date we don’t know yet about their impact in 
light of a publicly co-financed subsidy scheme.  
Before assessing the role of collaboration in an R&D subsidized context empirically, it is 
important to emphasize that collaboration may also be linked to certain risks.  For instance, 
collaborating firms run the risk of free riding of one of the partners, disclosing of the firms’ 
secrecy or weak IPR systems, rendering the appropriation of the returns of joint R&D 
projects difficult. Indeed, to be able to fully benefit from collaboration, a firm needs to build 
up specific competences and maintain a fruitful level of absorptive capacity to manage and 
coordinate collaborations efficiently and effectively. Otherwise, outgoing spillover effects 
might be higher than incoming spillover effects for some partners of the consortium, leading 
to the costs of collaboration being higher than the gains. Finally, incomplete contracts 
resulting from poor bargaining and costs of disclosure that are inherently linked to 
collaboration may render collaborative R&D costly if collaboration exceeds a certain 
threshold (Beck & Schenker–Wicki, 2014; Hottenrott & Lopes-Bento, 2014b). While such 
caveats are always true, they may be particularly pronounced for subsidized collaboration 
agreements insofar that firms may conclude collaborative R&D agreements to increase the 
chances of being retained for public support rather than because of true complementarity of 
skills or know-how between partners. Furthermore, coordination costs may be higher in the 
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case of subsidized collaboration agreements due to monitoring or reporting duties of the 
funding agency.  
The present analysis precisely aims at measuring such effects, by taking the type of partner 
within the subsidy scheme into account, thereby advising whether encouraging R&D 
collaboration overall, and industry-science links in particular, is an efficient policy criterion. 
4 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY  
4.1 Input additionality analysis  
In the first step of our analysis, we are interested in estimating the treatment effect of the 
R&D subsidies on firms’ R&D investments. As subsidies are not randomly distributed, one 
has to take the selection into the funding program into account in the evaluation analysis. 
Indeed, subsidized firms might differ from non-subsidized firms in important characteristics, 
and therefore the selection into the treatment has to be taken into account (Grilli & Murtinu, 
2011; Heckman, LaLonde, & Smith, 1999; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2008). While several 
modern econometric techniques exist allowing to address such a selection bias, our study 
applies a non-parametric nearest neighbour propensity score matching, as this is the most 
adequate method for the data at hand in this study (to be presented in the next section) 
(Angrist, 1998; Gerfin & Lechner, 2002; Lechner, 1999; Smith & Todd, 2005).  
The econometric matching allows to directly reply to the question of how much a subsidized 
firm would have invested in R&D if it would be in a counterfactual situation of not having 
received public support. Given that this counterfactual situation is never observable, it has to 
be estimated. Based on the assumption that we observe all the important characteristics 
driving the selection into the treatment (that is, provided that the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) is respected (Rubin, 1977)), we can approximate this counterfactual 
situation by firms having the same (or very similar) characteristics than the subsidized firms, 
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but have not received any support. In order to find such similar “twins”, we balance the 
subsamples of subsidized and non-subsidized firms according to the probability of receiving a 
subsidy. Based on a probit estimation, we obtain the conditional probability of receiving a 
subsidy in a single index, the propensity score. That means that we compare subsidized firms 
with firms that had the same probability of being subsidized, but did not receive public 
support. Based on this index, we apply a nearest neighbour matching estimation and use for 
each subsidized firm the single nearest neighbour to estimate the counterfactual situation 
(Dehejia & Wahba, 2002; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). On top of matching on the propensity 
score, we further require firms of the treated and control groups to belong to the same year 
and the same industry.  
The average treatment effect on the treated is estimated as follows: 
𝛼𝛼!"" =  
!
!!
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!
! − 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!
!!!
!!!         (1) 
where R&DiT  indicates R&D expenditures of treated firms and 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!!   the counterfactual 
situation, i.e. the potential outcome which would have been realized if the treatment group 
(S=1) had not been treated. S 𝜖𝜖 0,1  indicates the receipt of a subsidy and NT the number of 
treated firms.5  
4.2 Effectiveness of the R&D policy 
In a second part, we turn to the analysis of how the additional policy-induced R&D 
investment translates into innovation performance. More precisely, provided that we find 
positive input additionality, we want to know whether the publicly induced R&D investment 
                                                
5 Finally, in order for the matching to be possible, enough common support is needed between the sample of treated firms 
and the sample of potential control firms. To this end, the samples of treated and control firms need to have enough overlap 
in terms of probability of receiving a subsidy. Observations on treated firms with probabilities larger than the maximum and 
smaller than the minimum of the potential control group will therefore be deleted. 
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is as productive as the privately invested R&D expenditures, and if such impacts differ 
between radical or incremental innovations.  
Taking into account that not every firm in our sample has new product sales in each period, 
our outcome measures are characterized by a corner solution around zero (Tobin, 1958). For 
our analysis, we therefore use Tobit models to give point to these censored dependent 
variables.  
In order to disentangle public from private R&D investment, we estimate the policy impact at 
the firm level in the same fashion as Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014a) as follows: 
𝛼𝛼!
!! = 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷! − 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷! !         (2) 
where 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷! ! is equal to R&D intensity for the counterfactual firms. Indeed, for non-
subsidized firms for which 𝛼𝛼!!! is equal to zero, 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷! ! corresponds to their private R&D 
investment. For subsidized firms, the individual treatment effect corresponds to the difference 
of the treated firm and its counterfactual situation, namely its unsubsidized twin. This 
provides the estimated treatment effect by firm, allowing to estimate the policy induced 
investment separately from the privately invested money on subsequent innovation 
performance. Furthermore, it allows to take the size of the subsidy into account. 
The tobit model for 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅!  can then be estimated as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗! = 𝑋𝑋′!,!!!𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖!, 𝜖𝜖!~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑.𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎!)       (3.1) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅! =
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗!  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋′!,!!!𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖! > 0
0 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
      (3.2) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅! is the non-negative observable innovation performance variable, capturing 
radical innovation at the firm level. 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅! corresponds to the latent dependent variable 
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𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗! if latter is above zero and to zero otherwise. The model on the latent dependent 
variable, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗! is estimated by a parameter vector 𝛽𝛽, and a vector of firm characteristics 
𝑋𝑋!,!!!. The latter relationship is affected by a normally distributed error, to capture 
randomized firm influences. The model on incremental innovation is estimated analogously.  
In order for the estimates of a Tobit estimation to be consistent (see Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 
680-687), homoscedasticity is required. Given that we found evidence for heteroscedasticity 
based on a Likelihood Ratio test, we estimate heteroscedastic robust tobit models by 
maximum likelihood. Therefore, we replace the homoscedastic standard error term σ with σi 
= σexp(Z’α) in the likelihood function, modeling for group-wise multiplicative 
heteroscedasticity by including firm size and industry dummies. Accounting for the fact that 
our estimates for R&D investments (𝛼𝛼!!!, 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!) are estimated values for the treated firms, 
ordinary standard errors would be biased. We thus correct our standard errors by conducting 
a bootstrapping procedure.6   
5. DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION  
5.1 Data 
For the empirical analysis, the study uses a large-scale sample of Swiss firms derived from 
five waves (1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011) of the Swiss innovation survey, covering the 
years 1997-1999, 2000-2002, 2003-2005, 2006-2008 and 2009-2011. The Swiss innovation 
survey is a postal survey conducted by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute at the ETH Zurich, 
and corresponds largely to the European Community Innovation Survey following the OECD 
guidelines (OECD, 1992). Our data set provides us with a representative sample, covering 
both manufacturing and service industries. The data set contains detailed information on 
                                                
6 We bootstrap the entire procedure (inclusive of the matching) 150 times, allowing us to estimate how 
the sample mean of our actual sample varies due to random sampling.  
 17/49 
firms’ R&D and innovation activities, performance measures, subsidy receipts and other firm 
characteristics. The response rates from the surveys are: 33.8% (1999), 39.6% (2002), 38.7% 
(2005), 36.1% (2008), and 35.9% (2011). After eliminating missing values and limiting our 
sample to innovating firms only, we are left with a pooled cross-section of 6084 observations 
from 3552 different firms, out of which 546 received a subsidy.7 
5.2 Dependent variables 
Our analysis is separated into two main parts. For the treatment effects analysis, our outcome 
variable reflects the firms’ R&D investment, measured as the R&D expenditures to total 
turnover (RDINT). In the second part, following Meuer, Rupietta, and Backes-Gellner (2015), 
our outcome variables indicate radical innovation performance (RADICAL), measured as the 
sales share of radical innovative products and incremental innovation performance 
(INCREMENTAL), measured as the sales share of significantly improved products. To define 
our outcome variables, we follow the definition of the Swiss Innovation Survey. I.e. radically 
innovative products are defined as products being radically new to the firm or to the market 
and incrementally innovative products are defined as products that are significantly improved 
compared to already existing products. Since this is the definition of both types of innovation 
in the survey, other studies using this data follow the same definition (see for instance Meuer 
et al. (2015)). 8 Studies following the same definition of radical and incremental innovation 
for other countries include for instance Tether and Tajar (2008) and Ritala and Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen (2013).  
                                                
7 For more information on the subsidy distribution over the survey period as well as the number of 
sampled firms per year, see Table 1. 
8 The definition of these concepts can be explained by the size and characteristics of the Swiss market. 
Given that the Swiss market is rather small, closed and highly competitive, firms have to be very 
innovative to keep their market share. It is therefore commonly believed that a product that is new to 
the firm is also new to the market, as firms do not generally radically innovate for their local market 
only but rather for the global market. Based on this premise, the survey defines radical innovation as 
being new to the firm or new to the market in the Swiss Innovation Survey and incremental as being 
significantly improved.  
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5.3 Main explanatory variables 
The receipt of a subsidy is indicated by a dummy (PUBSUB) equal to one for subsidized 
firms and zero otherwise. Privately invested R&D expenditures and policy-induced 
expenditure are denoted by 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!  and 𝛼𝛼!!! respectively. 
As an important part of our setting is to analyse the role of R&D collaboration, we account 
for various collaboration partners. A dummy variable (RDCOOP) simply indicates if a firm is 
engaged in R&D collaboration. We then distinguish between vertical (CO_VERT), horizontal 
collaboration (CO_HOR), and collaboration with science (CO_SCIE).  
5.4 Other control variables  
We further control for a set of variables which might influence the selection into public 
funding and/or drive innovation performance. 
Having received a subsidy in the past might demonstrate existing competence and capabilities 
of the applicant and hence might influence the agency to select this firm again for a grant. We 
thus control for previous subsidies, where PAST_SUBSIDY equals one if a firm has received 
a subsidy in the past three years. Existing R&D capabilities may also be reflected in existing 
patents at the firm level. Indeed, patents may be a valid signal of previously successful R&D 
engagement. Consequently, we include a variable (PAT_EMPL) measuring patent 
applications per 1,000 employees to avoid potential multicollinearity with firm size. We 
further control for firm age (FIRMAGE) and (the log of) firm size (LNFIRMSIZE), as these 
are important characteristics in the funding scheme of the agency. Additionally, we take a 
non-linear relationship into account and control for the squared term of the two previously 
mentioned variables (FIRMAGE2, LNFIRMSIZE2). Labour productivity might also influence 
the agency in the approval process, as it can be seen as an indicator for high firm competi-
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tiveness. We include the natural logarithm of the sales share per employee (LNLABPROD). 
As stated by Cohen and Levinthal (1990), absorptive capacity is essential to integrate new 
knowledge. We therefore control for share of workforce with tertiary education in total 
employment (EMPACA). We further control for the fact that a firm belongs to a foreign 
group (FOREIGN). Subsidiaries with a foreign parent may be less likely to receive subsidies, 
because the parent may prefer to apply in its home country. Likewise, funding agencies may 
have a preference for local firms. Furthermore, foreign parents with local subsidiaries are 
typically larger firms and may therefore not be the priority target of the funding agency as 
SMEs generally constitute the main target group. It could, however, also be that firms 
belonging to a group may look attractive to a funding agency as the group membership 
possibly promises knowledge spillovers and thus economies of scope from the R&D process 
that go beyond national borders. It is thus unclear whether having a foreign parent plays 
favourably or not in receiving a subsidy from a Swiss funding agency. We take foreign 
market activities of a firm into account by controlling for its export activities. Highly export 
orientated firms might be more innovative, and hence more likely to apply for a subsidy. 
Export activities are measured by the export share to total turnover (EXPORT). In addition, 
we account for the level of general technological potential of a firm (TECHPOT) indicating 
the level of scientific and technological knowledge available to the firm for conducting 
innovation activities. TECHPOT is measured on a five point Likert-scale, where five 
indicates a high technological potential of the focal firm. Finally, five survey year dummies 
and seven industry sector dummies complement our set of control variables. 
5.5 Timing of variables 
As mentioned above, each wave of the survey covers a three-year period. In order to avoid 
endogeneity between the dependent variables and the covariates, we employ lagged values 
for the time-varying variables. Put differently, the data are measured in a way that time-
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varying variables are available for the three years of the survey, thereby allowing measuring 
the outcome at time t and the control at time t-1. In other words, while R&D investment and 
the share of sales of radically (or incrementally) new products are measured in period t, the 
controls are measures in period t-1. Table 2 provides the detail on the timing of the variables 
in our sample. For instance, suppose the dependent variables are measured in period t. Then 
variables such as for instance employment, export, labour productivity, patent stock per 
employee or higher educated employees potential are all measured in period t-1.  
Information on variables that are assumed more stable over time, such are for instance being 
part of a group or collaborating in R&D activities, are available for the 3-year-period, i.e. t-2 
to t. For instance, “Did your firm belong to a group during the period 2009-2011?”9 We 
consider age as truly exogenous and hence it is measured in period t.10  
                                                
9 See Arvanitis et al. (2013) for more information on the structure of the survey.  
10 For more information on the data structure, please refer to a review by Mairesse and Mohnen (2010), 
entitled “Using Innovation Surveys for  econometric analysis”, where the authors explain the general 
structure of the data in a very comprehensive way. More precisely, concerning the timing of the 
variables the authors explain that: "It is also the case that the innovation surveys refer to a 3-year 
period for most of the qualitative variables, and to the last year of that period for the quantitative 
variables. For instance, an enterprise may declare that they have introduced a new product on the 
market in the last 3 years, but its success and performance in doing so, as measured by the percentage 
of total sales attributed to the products introduced in the last 3 years, is assessed in the last year of that 
time-span.” Other studies using CIS data for related analyses include for instance Arvanitis (2012); 
Belderbos, Carree, and Lokshin (2004); Cassiman and Veugelers (2006). 
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Table 2: Definition and timing of measurement of the variables.  
Variable Description 
  
Dependent variables  
RDINTt Firms’ R&D expenditures divided by total turnover in period t. 
RADICALt Sales percentage of newly introduced products in period t. 
INCREMENTALt Sales percentage of substantially improved products in t. 
 
Independent variables  
SUBSIDYt-2 - t Binary variable equal to 1 if a firm obtained a subsidy during the period t-2 to t, 0 otherwise.11 
PAST_SUBSIDYt-3 
Binary variable equal to 1 if a firm has obtained a subsidy during the previous period, i.e. t-5 to 
t-3 and 0 otherwise. 
FIRMAGEt Age of the firm since foundation in years in period t. 
LNFIRMSIZEt-1 Natural logarithm of the number of employees (full time equivalents) in time t-1. 
PAT_EMPLt-1 Number of patent applications per 1,000 employees in the period t-1.  
LNLABPRODt-1 Natural logarithm of the sales share per employee in period t-1. 
FOREIGNt 
Binary variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a foreign group during the period t-2 to t and 0 
otherwise. 
EMPACAt-1 Share of workforce with tertiary education in total employment in t-1. 
EXPORTt-1 Share of exports in total turnover in t-1. 
RDCOOPt-2 - t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if a firm has engaged in R&D collaboration the period t-2 to t and 0 
otherwise. 
CO_VERTt-2 - t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if a firm has engaged in R&D collaboration with vertical partners (i.e. 
costumers, and suppliers) in period t-2 to t and 0 otherwise. 
CO_HORt-2 - t 
Binary variable equal to1 if a firm has engaged in R&D collaboration with horizontal partners 
(i.e. competitors) in t-2 to t and 0 otherwise. 
CO_SCIEt-2 - t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if a firm has engaged in R&D collaboration with science partners (i.e. 
universities, and other research institutes) in t-2 to t. 0 otherwise. 
TECHPOTt 
Nominal variable measuring technological potential, i.e. scientific and technological knowledge 
relevant to the firm's R&D or innovation activity (on a five point Likert-scale; 1 very low, 5 
very high technological potential). 
REGIONt 
Categorical variables: 1 = Lake Geneva Region; 2 = Espace Mittelland; 
3 = Northwestern Switzerland; 4 = Zurich; 5 = Eastern Switzerland; 
6 = Central Switzerland; 7 = Ticino. 
 
  
                                                
11 It should be noted that the fact that the subsidy receipt is measured over a 3-year-period is not a 
problem as firms are informed about the decision well in advance. For other studies using the treatment 
variable in the same manner, see for instance Aerts and Schmidt (2008); Cerulli and Potì (2012); 
Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004); Czarnitzki and Licht (2006); Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014); 
Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014a). 
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5.6 Descriptive statistics  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the variables in our analysis. Industry and size class 
distribution of our sample are displayed in Tables A.1 and A.2 of Appendix 1. As presented 
in Table 3, significant differences in the means of almost all variables between the subsidized 
firms and the non-subsidized firms exist. For instance, on average, subsidized firms are more 
likely to have experience in the past with subsidies, are slightly larger, have more approved 
patents per employee, have a higher likelihood belonging to a foreign group, have a higher 
educated workforce, are more export-oriented, have a higher technological potential, and 
engage more in R&D collaboration. Notably, they do not differ in firm age and labour 
productivity. With respect to the outcome variable, in alignment with our expectation, 
subsidized firms have on average higher R&D investments. However, at this point, we do not 
know how much of these additional R&D expenditures are induced by the subsidy or are due 
to other firm characteristics. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on innovating firms. 
 
 Unsubsidized firms,  
N = 5,538 
 Subsidized firms,  
N = 546 
 Results of t-tests 
on mean 
differences 
Variables 
 
Mean Std.dev. 
 
Mean Std.dev.   
  
 
Covariates    
PAST_SUBSIDY  0.016 0.124  0.203 0.403  *** 
FIRMAGE  65.2 42.2  68.2 54.0   
FIRMAGE2  6034.9 10583.9  7562.7 21140.4  * 
LNFIRMSIZE  4.269 1.410  4.930 1.515  *** 
LNFIRMSIZE2  20.215 13.411  26.597 16.368  *** 
PAT_EMPL  12.904 143.565  31.965 90.542  *** 
LNLABPROD  12.509 0.752  12.505 0.650   
FOREIGN  0.158 0.365  0.200 0.400  ** 
EMPACA  5.760 11.413  11.875 16.974  *** 
EXPORT  25.498 34.307  51.031 38.591  *** 
RDCOOP  0.186 0.389  0.639 0.481  *** 
CO_VERT  0.174 0.379  0.560 0.497  *** 
CO_HOR  0.066 0.248  0.220 0.414  *** 
CO_SCIE  0.094 0.291  0.570 0.496  *** 
TECHPOT  2.788 1.144  3.484 0.977  *** 
		   Outcome variable    
RDINT  1.400 3.894  5.747 13.606  *** 
 
 
6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Average effect of public funding on subsidized firms  
As described above, we employ a matching estimation to identify the average treatment effect 
of public R&D grants on the treated firms. To be able to apply the matching estimator, we 
need to predict the probability of receiving public R&D funding. Therefore, we estimate a 
probit model on a subsidy receipt incorporating important characteristics for the selection into 
the funding scheme. As can be seen in Table 4, with the exception of firm age, patents per 
 24/49 
employee, and being member of a foreign group, all our covariates are important drivers for 
the selection into the treatment.12  
Table 4: Probit estimation on the probability of receiving a 
subsidy.  
Variables Coefficient Standard errors 
PAST_SUBSIDY 1.149*** (0.100)  
FIRMAGE -0.001 (0.000)  
FIRMAGE2 0.000 (0.000)  
LNFIRMSIZE 0.142* (0.090)  
LNFIRMSIZE2 -0.004 (0.010)  
PAT_EMPL 0.000 (0.000)  
LNLABPROD -0.217*** (0.040)  
FOREIGN -0.082 (0.070)  
EMPACA 0.013*** (0.000)  
EXPORT 0.004*** (0.000)  
RDCOOP 0.770*** (0.060)  
TECHPOT 0.148*** (0.030)  
No. of observations 6084  
Log likelihood  -1392.4211  
Joint significance of industry 
dummies 
χ2(6) = 19.92*** 
 
Joint significance of survey year 
dummies 
χ2(4) = 27.01*** 
 
Note: The model includes a constant, industry and survey year dummies (not 
presented). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
Table 5 presents the results of our econometric matching estimation. We can see that all our 
covariates are well-balanced after the matching. This points to the fact that our matching was 
successful and that we found a close neighbour for each of our treated firms. The only 
variable that remains statistically significant is the outcome variable. We can thus attribute 
this difference to the treatment and can conclude that, in line with the literature, full crowding 
out can be rejected.   
In order to take a potential selection on unobservables into account, we test the robustness of 
our matching estimation by conducting an IV regression. The results of the IV regression as 
                                                
12 It should be noted that due to the potential endogeneity of R&D collaboration, we have estimated an 
IV regression on R&D subsidies, instrumenting R&D collaboration. This did not change our findings 
as R&D collaboration remained highly significant in the second stage (and the instruments pass all the 
statistical tests in the first stage). The detailed regression results can be obtained by the authors upon 
request.    
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well as the choice of our IVs are presented in detail Appendix 2 (Table A.3). Conclusions 
remain unchanged even if we allow for a selection on unobservables.  
Table 5: Average treatment effect of public R&D funding. 
 
 
Selected control group, N=530 
 
Subsidized firms, N=530 
 p-value of t-tests on 
mean differences 
Variables 
 
Mean Std.dev. 
 
Mean Std.dev.   
  
 
Covariates    
PAST_SUBSIDY  0.145 0.353  0.179 0.384  0.195 
FIRMAGE  69.8 47.2  68.4 54.1  0.707 
FIRMAGE2  7097.0 11617.0  7605.1 21382.6  0.656 
LNFIRMSIZE  4.765 1.452  4.891 1.485  0.234 
LNFIRMSIZE2  24.815 14.577  26.120 15.855  0.228 
PAT_EMPL  20.623 54.565  28.963 79.044  0.072 
LNLABPROD  12.483 0.668  12.496 0.648  0.784 
FOREIGN  0.183 0.387  0.198 0.399  0.591 
EMPACA  12.578 19.054  11.259 16.303  0.311 
EXPORT  49.026 38.315  50.302 38.537  0.644 
RDCOOP  0.632 0.483  0.628 0.484  0.913 
TECHPOT  3.453 1.015  3.457 0.974  0.958 
		  Outcome variable    
RDINT  3.453 5.859  5.698 13.717  0.001 
Note: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 16 observations are lost because of the 
common support condition. 
 
6.2 The impact on innovation performance  
In the following section, we turn to the analysis on innovation performance, as measured by 
the sales share of radically and incrementally new products respectively. Before turning to the 
analysis, we provide some additional descriptive information on the variables that have not 
been used so far. 
More precisely, in Table 6 we show the distribution of radical and incremental innovation 
sales, as well as the distribution of policy induced and privately motivated R&D investment. 
We can see that the average sales share from radically new products is of 14.4% in our 
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sample. Incremental innovations account for 16.7% of the total turnover of the firms in our 
sample. The average treatment effect amounts to 0.13%, while the private R&D investments 
corresponds to 1.86%. Furthermore, we see that even though the average treatment effect is 
positive, we have also some firms that experience a negative additionality. Specifically, as 
shown by Table 7, 43% of the treated firms have a negative alpha. In other words, for 43% of 
the firms, the R&D expenditures did not go up, but to the contrary, the firms spent less 
money on R&D even though they have received a subsidy. This can happen in case a project 
gets abandoned for instance, and all the related expenditures get cancelled as a consequence. 
While this may seem high, very similar results have been found for subsidized firms in 
Belgium, where 43,5% of subsidized firms experienced a negative additionality (see 
Hottenrott et al., 2014). Roughly 9% of the subsidized firms have an additionality of zero, 
meaning that they have spent exactly what they have received from the government, thereby 
not creating additional R&D expenditures in the economy. Finally, the lion’s share of the 
subsidized firms (46.5%) has a positive additionality, as one would expect by the way the 
policy is constructed. In different words, these firms have respected to co-financing clause 
and have added private money to increase their overall R&D expenditures. Finally, 0.1% 
have an additionality above 50, which means that they invest over half of their turnover in 
R&D. While this may seem unlikely, it should be noted that it concerns only 5 firms, two of 
which are very small (6 employees and 9 employees respectively). For such small firms, very 
high additionalities are not surprising.  
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Table 6: Additional descriptive statistics, N= 4,862.  
Variables Observations Mean Std.dev. Min. Max. 
RADICAL 4,862 14.406 18.139 0 100 
INCREMENTAL 4,862 16.706 19.654 0 100 
α!
!! 4,862 0.127 3.899 -52.134 100.0 
R&D! 4,862 1.862 4.218 0 55.6 
 
 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics on the output additionalities α!!!, accounting for firm size and 
age, N=477.13  
Percentages of firms  Firm Size  Firm Age 
N=477  S = 1–49 M = 50 – 249 L = 250-max.   <15 16-30 31-75 76-max. 
α!
!!	<	0	 43.40  15.94 51.69 32.37  6.28 10.63 41.55 41.55 
α!
!!	=	0	 9.01  23.26 34.88 41.86  9.30 23.26 27.91 39.53 
α!
!! >	0	 46.54  29.52 43.17 27.31  4.85 22.91 39.65 32.60 
α!
!!	>	50 1.05  40.00 - 60.00  - 20.00 60.00 20.00 
 
Table 8 displays the results of the heteroscedasticity-robust Tobit models on innovation 
outcome. Models one to five relate to the impact of both types of R&D investment on radical 
innovation, while models six to ten relate to incremental innovation. The various models per 
category take into account different collaboration patterns.  
Our baseline model for the impact on radical innovation (Model I), shows that both, policy-
induced as well as privately invested R&D are positive and highly significant. Furthermore, 
we see that the coefficients are of a similar size. Put differently, a 10% increase in the 
counterfactual R&D investment would lead to a 4,4 percentage point increase in the 
estimated latent dependent variable, i.e. the estimated sales share in radical innovation sales, 
on average, while a 10% increase in policy induced R&D investment would lead to a 3,7 
                                                
13 It should be noted that the number of subsidized firms corresponds to the number of subsidized firms 
of the Tobit models, where we lose some observations because of missing values in the outcome 
variables.  
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percentage point increase in the estimated latent variable. Models two and three, containing a 
dummy for overall collaboration (Model II) and three dummies for vertical, horizontal and 
collaboration with science (Model III) respectively, show that neither overall, nor a specific 
type of collaboration displays a significant effect on the estimated sales share in radical 
innovation. Policy-induced as well as privately motivated R&D investments stay positive and 
of the same magnitude.  
Next, to assess whether these effects change in light of the receipt of a subsidy, we interact 
privately as well as publicly induced R&D investment with different collaboration patterns. 
Model IV starts by interacting the overall collaboration dummy with both types of R&D 
investment. We see that neither one of the interaction terms is significant. In other words, the 
R&D investments driven by collaboration do not impact the estimated sales share of radical 
innovation. The same conclusion can be drawn for Model V, where we interact the three 
different types of collaboration with both types of R&D investment. We can thus conclude 
that collaborating, with science or another partner, does not improve the policy impact of the 
subsidy in terms of radical innovation sales.  
Turning to the impact on incremental innovation, we see that in line with our expectations, 
privately motivated R&D expenditures are significant. What strives our attention is the non-
significant result of the publicly induced R&D investment, 𝛼𝛼!!! (Model VI). While the 
coefficient is larger in magnitude than it is for radical innovation, it is not statistically 
significant. Even though the funding agency also supports incremental innovation projects, 
this finding points to the fact that the publicly induced part of the R&D investment mainly 
impacts radical innovation. 
Going forward, we control for overall collaboration (Model VII) before differentiating 
between the types of external collaboration partners, namely horizontal, vertical and diagonal 
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collaboration (Model VIII). As was the case for the radical innovation sales share, neither one 
of the collaboration dummies is significant, nor do they impact the results from the baseline 
model. When interacting both types of R&D investment with the collaboration dummy, we 
see that while the counterfactual R&D spending stays significant and positive, both privately 
and publicly invested parts of the investment that are interacted with collaboration are 
insignificant.  
Finally, in Model X we interact both types of R&D investment with the three different 
collaboration types. While collaboration with science overall displays a positive and 
significant impact in this case (as well as the counterfactual R&D spending), we see that parts 
of these positive impacts turn negative when driven by collaboration (CO_SCIE*𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!). 
Furthermore, when publicly induced R&D investment is driven by horizontal collaboration, 
the insignificant impacts of these variables turns negative and significant if interacted 
(CO_HOR*α!!!).  
While the results of our models containing collaboration information may seem surprising, 
there may be several reasons able to explain such findings. For radical innovation, neither one 
of the collaboration installations have any impact on sales success, even though the funding 
agency encourages R&D collaboration between firms and especially between firms and 
science. One explanation for the insignificant results may be the fact that Switzerland is a 
relatively closed country, where firms are not used to collaborate (as a matter of illustration, 
roughly 13% of the firms in Switzerland collaborate, compared to some 30% in Belgium for 
instance). Hence, firms may have developed the necessary skills and know-how over the 
years and are therefore less dependent on pooling resources with external partners. In this 
case, collaboration costs may indeed exceed gains in certain settings. In the case of Model X 
the fact that collaboration with science is negative may be explained by the fact that typically, 
 30/49 
collaboration with science is needed when firms intend undertaking path-breaking 
innovations, pushing the technological frontier. For incremental innovation, such type of 
collaboration is therefore not necessarily attractive, and may deviate resources from where 
they could have been invested more appropriately in terms of incremental change to existing 
products. Hence, if the strategy of the firm is to ensure long-term survival perspectives 
through incremental innovation, it seems that collaborating with science is not maximizing its 
partnership behaviour. The negative impact of collaboration with competitors (horizontal 
collaboration) and its impact on the sales share of incremental innovation can be explained by 
the fact that incremental innovations are often times easier to imitate than radical innovations. 
Teaming up with a competitor may therefore mean losing parts of the market to that partner.     
In terms of policy effects in light of collaboration type, our results thus do not show any 
evidence that subsidized collaborating firms are more productive in terms of new products 
than non-subsidized firms. To the contrary, we even find weak, yet negative results for the 
interaction of policy driven investment and horizontal and science collaboration. While the 
overall policy effect of the Swiss funding agency is positive, the encouragement of 
collaboration should be revisited.  
Before concluding, it should be noted that we took the potential endogeneity of our 
collaboration variables into account. In Appendix 3, we estimate a structural equation as 
introduced by Smith and Blundell (1986) to see if our results are driven by endogenetiy. As 
shown by the results in Table A.4, our findings are not driven by endogeneity. Furthermore, 
we allowed for a longer time lag as one may argue that the impact of both types of R&D 
investment or collaboration may need more time to impact radical than incremental 
innovations. As can be seen by Table A.5 in Appendix 4, our conclusions remain unchanged 
if we allow for a longer time lag. Finally, we also re-estimated the main models controlling 
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for other innovation expenditures. Indeed, one may argue that the way R&D translates into 
marketable products also depends on the expenditures done on top of R&D investment, 
independent of whether R&D was subsidized or not.14 We therefore control for innovation 
expenditures in the regressions of Table A.6 in Appendix 5, to see if our findings hold for a 
given level of innovation investment.15 As can be seen from Table A.6, our conclusions 
remain unchanged.  
It should be noted that due to the lower number of observations in the estimations with an 
additional time lag and in the estimations including other innovation investment, the 
significance levels drop slightly, as the lower number of observations induces larger standard 
errors.16  
 
                                                
14 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.  
15 Innovation expenditures include R&D expenditures, but also other expenditures needed in the 
innovation process, such as expenditures for construction and design, further follow-up investments, 
including acquisition of other external knowledge, acquisition of specific machinery or software 
needed for the development or finalization of technologies, as well as expenditures related to the 
certification of products or packaging technology. Innovation investment enters the equation net of 
R&D expenditures to avoid double counting.  
16 The missing observations in the models with additional time lags are due to the unbalanced nature of 
our panel. The missing values in the estimation containing net innovation investment is due the missing 
values in this variable.  
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Table 8: Heteroscedasticity-robust Tobit estimates on radical and incremental innovation performance. 
   RADICAL  INCREMENTAL 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V  Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX Model X 
α!
!!  0.371** 0.370** 0.366** 0.203 0.237  0.522 0.521 0.526 0.214 0.289 
                                (0.153) (0.154) (0.153) (0.377) (0.356)  (0.349) (0.352) (0.361) (0.395) (0.383) 
R&D!   0.444*** 0.437*** 0.428*** 0.512*** 0.548***  0.364** 0.352** 0.332** 0.782*** 0.770*** 
                                (0.119) (0.117) (0.121) (0.158) (0.158)  (0.148) (0.144) (0.146) (0.235) (0.207) 
RDCOOP                         0.416             0.540               0.735             2.126**             
                                 (0.909)             (0.927)               (1.029)             (0.979)             
FIRMAGE                        -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.063***  -0.120** -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.120*** -0.118*** 
                                (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.045) 
FIRMAGE2                       0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
                                (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LNFIRMSIZE                      0.889 0.884 0.934 0.936 1.018  -0.924 -0.930 -0.739 -0.940 -0.627 
                                (0.917) (0.919) (0.916) (0.945) (0.969)  (1.172) (1.171) (1.147) (1.170) (1.121) 
LNFIRMSIZE2                     -0.095 -0.096 -0.104 -0.101 -0.111  0.117 0.114 0.087 0.116 0.081 
                                (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.094) (0.098)  (0.115) (0.115) (0.111) (0.115) (0.108) 
EXPORT                        0.053*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052***  0.043*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 
                                (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
TECHPOT                        1.399*** 1.373*** 1.336*** 1.356*** 1.276**  2.151*** 2.109*** 2.006*** 2.021*** 1.838*** 
                                (0.436) (0.422) (0.456) (0.434) (0.501)  (0.389) (0.381) (0.390) (0.394) (0.429) 
continued             
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continued  RADICAL  INCREMENTAL 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V  Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX Model X 
CO_VERT                                      -0.542  -1.534               0.329  -1.172 
                                             (1.763)  (1.874)               (1.157)  (1.341) 
CO_HOR                                       0.227  0.074               3.334  4.707 
                                             (1.480)  (2.231)               (3.220)  (3.903) 
CO_SCIE                                      1.392  3.115               0.257  3.396* 
                                             (2.078)  (2.926)               (2.276)  (1.900) 
RDCOOP*𝛼𝛼!!!                           0.386                                       0.663             
                                                         (0.673)                                       (0.638)             
RDCOOP *𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!                             -0.101                                       -0.678             
                                                         (0.215)                                       (0.416)             
CO_VERT*𝛼𝛼!!!                            0.322                                       0.683 
                                                          (0.670)                                       (0.800) 
CO_VERT*𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!                              0.383                                       0.431 
                                                          (0.276)                                       (0.267) 
CO_HOR*𝛼𝛼!!!                            0.381                                       -0.847* 
                                                          (0.489)                                       (0.507) 
CO_HOR*𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!                              0.077                                       -0.362 
                                                          (0.424)                                       (0.312) 
CO_SCIE*𝛼𝛼!!!                            -0.073                                       0.135 
                                                          (0.607)                                       (0.740) 
CO_SCIE*𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!                              -0.644                                       -1.103*** 
                                                                     (0.434)                                       (0.406) 
No. of observations  4,862 4,862 4,862 4,862 4,862  4,862 4,862 4,862 4,862 4,862 
Source: Own calculations. Data derived from the Innovation survey conducted by the Swiss Economic Institute (KOF). Note: Standard deviations in parentheses are clustered at the firm level 
and bootstrapped with 150 replications. Time and industry dummies are jointly significant (not presented). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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7. CONCLUSION  
Our study is an extension of previous studies interested in the effects of public R&D polices 
on input and/or output additionality. We contribute to current knowledge on the effect of such 
policy by providing evidence as to where the policy impact is highest, radical or incremental 
innovation. Furthermore, we take specific collaboration patterns into account to see whether 
these impacts are affected by R&D collaboration as well as the type thereof (i.e. horizontal, 
vertical or with science).  
In terms of input additionality, we find, in line with previous studies, evidence that allows 
rejecting the null hypothesis of full crowding out. Taking into account the degree of novelty 
in terms of innovation performance, this analysis fills a gap by providing evidence on the fact 
that the impact of the Swiss funding agency is higher for radical than for incremental 
innovation, as there is no significant impact for the latter in terms of policy induced R&D 
expenditures. In line with our expectations, privately invested R&D expenditures are positive 
and significant for both types of innovation output.  
 Given that the Swiss funding policy encourages firms to collaborate in their R&D activities, 
our work integrates information on firms’ collaboration status. Compared to previous studies 
that only consider whether or not a firm qualifies as collaborator, we additionally account for 
specific types of collaboration partners. We are thus able to investigate the effects of different 
collaboration constellations, i.e. horizontal, vertical and collaboration with science in our 
framework. While the fact of collaborating as such does not impact the sales share of either 
incremental or radical innovation, we find that when collaboration types are interacted with 
R&D investment, parts of the investment driven by collaboration (horizontal and science) 
turns negative in the case of incremental innovation. Hence, the policy effect is not enhanced 
 35/49 
by a specific collaboration strategy and collaborative R&D should not necessarily constitute a 
priority for the Swiss funding agency.    
Combing strategic management literature on radical vs. incremental innovation and on 
collaboration impacts with literature on policy evaluation, our study also allows drawing 
implications from a managerial perspective. From a managerial point of view, the findings 
are relevant from mainly two angles. In terms of subsidy strategy, it is vital for a manager to 
know that it is more likely for a subsidy to have the desired impact when used for more 
radical innovation projects. From a collaboration strategy perspective, it is important to know 
that there are also downsides to engaging into collaboration. Hence, if tempted to engage in 
R&D collaborations in order to increase the probability of receiving a subsidy, managers 
should be aware that there may also be downsides to this strategy, and that the impact of the 
subsidy may even turn negative in light of collaboration. 
Despite all efforts, our analysis is not without limitation. One improvement would be to have 
access to panel data, allowing to follow firms over time, thereby being able to analyse the 
impact of a subsidy in a before-after setting. Furthermore, having information about the 
rejected applicants would have allowed for a series of additional robustness checks to 
strengthen our findings.   
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Appendices 
Appendix	1:	Additional	descriptive	statistics	
Table A.1: Industry distribution. 
Industry 
Number of  
firms Percentages   
Percentage 
of subsidized 
firms per sector 
1 Construction, mining, energy 441 7.25  5.90 
2 Consumer goods (food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, 
clothing) 433 7.12 
 
9.01 
3 Intermediate goods (paper, printing, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, rubber, plastics, minerals, basic metals) 1,051 17.27 
 
9.13 
4 Investment goods (fabricated metals, machinery & 
equipment, electrical equipment, electronics and optical 
products, medical instruments, watches, vehicles, and 
other manufacturing) 2,111 34.7 
 
13.55 
5 Traditional services (trade, transportation, 
telecommunications) 923 15.17 
 
4.55 
6 Knowledge-based services (banking, insurance, 
information technology & services, technical 
commercial services)  874 14.37 
 
5.72 
7 Other services 251 4.13  2.79 
Total 6,084 100  8.97 (on average) 
 
Table A.2: Size class distribution. 
Size class 
Size class  
distribution 
Number  
of firms Percentages  
Percentage 
of subsidized 
firms per size class 
1 Small-sized firms 1 – 49 2,489 40.91  5.10 
2 Medium-sized 50 – 249 2,405 39.53  10.27 
3 Large-sized 250 – max. 1,190  19.56  14.45 
 Total 6,084 100  8.97 (on average) 
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Appendix 2 
Robustness check for the matching estimation accounting for potential selection on 
unobservables 
An essential assumption to conduct a valid matching estimation is the conditional independ-
ence assumption (CIA). Indeed, for the matching estimation to be valid, the outcome has to 
be statistically independent of program participation, conditional on a series of observable 
characteristics. This fundamental assumption is however not testable. Therefore, we test the 
robustness of our matching estimation results by taking into account the selection on 
observables. We do so using an instrumental variables (IV) approach.  
To conduct our IV regression, we employ two instruments for the subsidy receipt. First, we 
use the likelihood of receiving a subsidy by region and industry (IV_1); and second, we use 
the likelihood of collaborating with science by industry (IV_2).  
IV_1 is justified by the fact that funding agencies often have preferences in terms of location 
or industries. Even though such priorities are not formal conditions, it may very well be that a 
firm based in direct proximity of a funding agency is more aware of the policy and is more 
visible to the decision makers than a firm that is situated further away. Hence, being part of a 
region or an industry where the likelihood of receiving a subsidy is high, is likely to impact 
the receipt of a subsidy of firm i. The rationale of using the industry average of collaboration 
with science institutions as an instrument (IV_2) documents the fact that some technological 
trajectories have closer relationships to universities and other research centres. Having a 
closer relationship to science collaboration increases the likelihood of being retained for 
funding, given that the Swiss government aims at increasing industry – science links.  
Both instruments fulfil the statistical tests for being valid instruments. In the first stage, both 
IVs are highly significant. In the second stage, the Hansen J-test of overidentification is 
insignificant. Hence, both from a statistical as well as from an economic point of view, our 
instruments are valid. As displayed in Table A.4, the results of the IV estimation are in line 
with what we find in our matching estimation.  
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Table A.3: Robustness test with instrumental variables for subsidies on R&D intensity. 
  First stage   Second stage 
Variables SUBSIDY   2SLS on R&DINT 
SUBSIDY_REG_IND (IV_1) 0.672***    
 
(0.058)    
CO_SCIE_IND (IV_2) 0.404***    
 (0.118)    
SUBSIDY    6.363*** 
    (1.804) 
PAST_SUBSIDY 0.330***   0.424 
 (0.034)   (1.719) 
FIRMAGE 0.000   -0.005* 
 (0.000)   (0.003) 
FIRMAGE2 0.000   0.000 
 (0.000)   (0.000) 
LNFIRMSIZE 0.003   -0.713** 
 (0.012)   (0.342) 
LNFIRMSIZE2 0.001   0.049 
 (0.001)   (0.032) 
PATCOUNT_E~L 0.000   0.005*** 
 (0.000)   (0.002) 
LNLABPROD -0.012***   -0.636*** 
 (0.004)   (0.157) 
FOREIGN -0.020*   0.515 
 (0.011)   (0.331) 
EMPACA 0.002***   0.083*** 
 (0.000)   (0.020) 
EXPORT																						 0.000***   0.019*** 
 (0.000)   (0.005) 
RDCOOP 0.135***   0.030 
 (0.011)   (0.372) 
TECHPOT 0.012***   0.235*** 
 (0.003)   (0.059) 
No. of observations 6,084   6,084 
Uncentered R2 0.291   0.232 
F-Test of excl. instruments  F(2, 3551) =    71.52***    
Hansen's J test statistic     χ2(1))= 0.971 
Note: IV_1 is the region and industry mean of the likelihood of receiving a subsidy. IV_2 is the industry sector mean 
of the likelihood of collaborating with science institutes. Both models include an intercept, time and industry 
dummies (not presented). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. *** (**, *) indicate a 
significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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Appendix 3 
Robustness check for potential endogeneity of the collaboration variable in the innovation 
outcome equation  
In our innovation outcome estimations, we face the problem that one of our main explanatory 
variable might be endogenous, namely our collaboration variables. In order to test if our 
results are affected by potential endogeneity, we conduct a structural equation approach 
introduced by Smith and Blundell (1986). For the sake of this robustness check, we defined 
two instrumental variables for our potential endogenous collaboration variable RDCOOP 
following the advices of Murray (2006). Our first instrumental variable IND_COOP (IV_1) 
captures the share of collaborating firms by industry (at nace-2-level) in previous years. The 
rationale behind this instrument is that the higher the share of collaborating firms in a given 
industry, the higher is the probability that a firm i in industry j engages in collaboration in a 
given period. Our second instrumental variable COOP_EXP (IV_2) is defined as the overall 
collaboration experience of a firm i in our sample, and takes values from 0 to 5. The more 
experience a firm has in collaboration, the higher the likelihood of this firm to engage in a 
collaboration again.  
To further test the statistical validity of our instruments employed for the Blundell-Smith test 
of exogeneity, we ran a couple of tests on the validity of the chosen instruments. It should be 
noted though that we have to use the standard Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) approach, as 
standard tests of over-identification do not exist for the Blundell-Smith approach. Our two 
excluded instruments are jointly statistical significant at the 1%-level (F(2, 2722) = 647.97), 
and the Hansen J test of over-identification cannot be rejected for radical innovation 
performance (Hansen J statistic = 2.540, p=.111), nor for incremental innovation performance 
(Hansen J statistic = 2.578, p=.108). Finally, both our instruments are statistically significant 
in the first stage of the equation. Considering the above results, we can conclude that our two 
instrumental variables satisfy the statistical requirements. 
As can be see seen in Table A.4, the first stage residuals are not significant in the innovation 
outcome equations. Therefore, we can conclude that our findings are not driven by 
endogeneity.  
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Table A.4: Robustness test with instrumental variables for R&D collaboration on 
innovation outcomes.  
  First stage Probit:   Second stage Tobit: 
Variables RDCOOP  RADICAL INCREMENTAL 
IND_COOP (IV_1)                     -0.560*    
                               (0.307)    
COOP_EXP (IV_2)                1.146***    
                               (0.047)    
RDINT                          0.011  0.446*** 0.387*** 
                               (0.007)  (0.068) (0.081) 
FIRMAGE                        -0.001  -0.061*** -0.080*** 
                               (0.001)  (0.014) (0.017) 
FIRMAGE2                       0.000  0.000*** 0.000*** 
                               (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
LNFIRMSIZE                     0.01  0.865 -1.235 
                               (0.072)  (1.083) (1.269) 
LNFIRMSIZE2                    -0.003  -0.08 0.124 
                               (0.007)  (0.109) (0.129) 
EXPORT																						 0.001  0.031*** 0.043*** 
                               (0.001)  (0.011) (0.012) 
TECHPOT                        0.096***  1.652*** 2.278*** 
                               (0.027)  (0.310) (0.361) 
RDCOOP                                    1.283 0.12 
                                            (1.210) (1.398) 
1ST STAGE RESIDUALS               -0.026 0.248 
                                            (0.172) (0.198) 
No. of observations 4,224  4,224 4,224 
Note: IV_1 represents the industry mean of collaborating firms in previous years. IV_2 reflects the firm’s overall 
collaboration experience. The second stage Tobit models employ heteroscedastic-robust estimations. All stages 
include an intercept, time and industry dummies (not presented). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at 
the firm level. *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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Appendix 4: Using a different time structure 
Table A.5: Robustness check controlling for additional time lags (including a survey-time-lag, corresponding to a 4-year-time-lag). Heterosce-
dasticity-robust Tobit estimates on radical and incremental innovation performance. 
   RADICAL  INCREMENTAL 
Lagged variables  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V  Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX Model X 
α!
!!  0.809* 0.802* 0.808* 0.837 0.844  0.114 0.106 0.113 0.031 0.034 
                                (0.441) (0.451) (0.449) (0.631) (0.570)  (0.466) (0.460) (0.464) (0.837) (0.743) 
R&D!   0.844*** 0.811*** 0.835*** 0.809*** 0.813***  0.875*** 0.859*** 0.863*** 0.874*** 0.873*** 
                                (0.165) (0.164) (0.169) (0.279) (0.307)  (0.215) (0.227) (0.222) (0.318) (0.311) 
RDCOOP                         4.238***             4.411***               1.800  1.664             
                                 (1.399)             (1.214)               (1.899)  (2.397)             
FIRMAGE                        -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018  -0.026 -0.027 -0.025 -0.026 -0.025 
                                (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039)  (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
FIRMAGE2                       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
                                (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LNFIRMSIZE                      4.045** 4.214** 4.408*** 4.110** 4.165***  -0.259 -0.172 -0.125 -0.005 0.036 
                                (1.787) (1.725) (1.693) (1.674) (1.618)  (2.292) (2.268) (2.307) (2.254) (2.244) 
LNFIRMSIZE2                     -0.155 -0.193 -0.214 -0.185 -0.192  0.249 0.233 0.224 0.219 0.213 
                                (0.200) (0.187) (0.180) (0.179) (0.168)  (0.243) (0.242) (0.243) (0.240) (0.235) 
EXPORT                        0.042** 0.033 0.038* 0.034 0.038*  0.079*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 
                                (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)  (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
TECHPOT                        1.437*** 1.255** 1.214** 1.250** 1.205**  1.922*** 1.856*** 1.835*** 1.858*** 1.810*** 
                                (0.492) (0.496) (0.490) (0.499) (0.508)  (0.553) (0.538) (0.539) (0.538) (0.536) 
continued             
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continued  RADICAL  INCREMENTAL 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V  Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX Model X 
CO_VERT                                      2.193  0.752               2.451  1.947 
                                             (1.628)  (1.955)               (2.788)  (3.730) 
CO_HOR                                       5.955**  5.449               2.208  1.543 
                                             (2.961)  (3.967)               (2.220)  (2.785) 
CO_SCIE                                      -0.666  1.313               -1.448  -0.851 
                                             (2.032)  (3.006)               (2.389)  (2.914) 
RDCOOP*𝛼𝛼!!!                           -0.242                                       0.420             
                                                         (0.671)                                       (0.865)             
RDCOOP *𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!                             -0.033                                       0.004             
                                                         (0.436)                                       (0.459)             
CO_VERT*𝛼𝛼!!!                            0.410                                       0.381 
                                                          (1.094)                                       (1.217) 
CO_VERT*𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!                              0.556                                       0.271 
                                                          (0.445)                                       (0.670) 
CO_HOR*𝛼𝛼!!!                            0.575                                       -0.249 
                                                          (0.753)                                       (1.010) 
CO_HOR*𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!                              0.173                                       0.262 
                                                          (0.515)                                       (0.539) 
CO_SCIE*𝛼𝛼!!!                            -0.780                                       0.312 
                                                          (1.097)                                       (1.347) 
CO_SCIE*𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷!                              -0.643                                       -0.326 
                                                                     (0.704)                                       (0.594) 
No. of observations  1,924 1,924 1,924 1,924 1,924  1,924 1,924 1,924 1,924 1,924 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses are clustered at the firm level and bootstrapped with 150 replications. Time and industry dummies are jointly significant (not presented). *** (**, *) 
indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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Appendix 5: Accounting for other innovation investments 
 
Table A.6: Robustness check: Heteroscedastic-robust Tobit estimates on radical and 
incremental innovation performance, holding other innovation investments constant. 
   RADICAL  INCREMENTAL 
Variables  Model I Model II Model III  Model VI Model VII Model VIII 
α!
!!  0.416* 0.417* 0.418*  0.598 0.599 0.603 
                                (0.250) (0.254) (0.251)  (0.381) (0.386) (0.397) 
R&D!   0.528*** 0.518*** 0.539***  0.749*** 0.715*** 0.689*** 
                                (0.147) (0.152) (0.155)  (0.244) (0.235) (0.232) 
INNO_INV  0.303*** 0.303*** 0.301***  -0.282 -0.281 -0.283 
  (0.091) (0.091) (0.092)  (0.257) (0.255) (0.257) 
RDCOOP                         0.464    1.750*  
                                 (1.206)    (1.054)  
CO_VERT                                      2.136*    -0.085 
                                             (1.267)    (1.618) 
CO_HOR                                       -2.046    2.384 
                                             (2.824)    (2.247) 
CO_SCIE                                      -1.994    2.669 
                                             (1.623)    (1.647) 
FIRMAGE                         -0.127** -0.127** -0.129**  -0.097*** -0.098*** -0.095*** 
                                (0.054) (0.055) (0.056)  (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
FIRMAGE2                        0.000* 0.000* 0.000*  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
                                (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LNFIRMSIZE                      1.446 1.438 1.352  3.604 3.592 3.657 
                                (1.198) (1.189) (1.169)  (2.318) (2.287) (2.257) 
LNFIRMSIZE2                     -0.122 -0.123 -0.110  -0.310 -0.314 -0.329 
                                (0.115) (0.113) (0.111)  (0.217) (0.214) (0.211) 
EXPORT                        0.054** 0.053** 0.053**  0.019 0.016 0.015 
                                (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)  (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
TECHPOT                         1.257** 1.235** 1.320***  2.255*** 2.172*** 2.060*** 
                                (0.527) (0.498) (0.462)  (0.459) (0.454) (0.443) 
No. of observations   3,477 3,477 3,477  3,477 3,477 3,477 
Note: Bootstrapped standard deviations in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. Time and industry dummies are jointly 
significant (not presented). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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